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OBSE RVATIONS
ON THE
CONDUCT
OF
GREAT-BRITAIN,

In Respect to
FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

IN WHICH

All the OBJECTIONS that have been
thrown out in some late PAMPHLETS
and DISCOURSES are fairly answered,
and the MEASURES of the PRESENT
MINISTRY fully Vindicated.

L O N D O N :

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THE
CONDUCT
OF
GREAT-BRITAIN,

In Respect to
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, &c.

IT has been sometimes thought a Point that would admit of Dispute, whether, considering our Situation as an Island, we ought to take any great Share in the Affairs of the Continent or not. It is no difficult Matter for Men of great Parts, and who are well vers'd in political Learning, to give a Colour of Reason to any Opinion whatsoever, and consequently both Sides of this Question may be maintained, by such plausible Arguments as to hinder our distinguishing

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guishing with Certainty on which the Truth lies. But if we call in Experience to our Assistance, and consider with ourselves which of our Princes have made the greatest Figure, those who attended to, or those who neglected foreign Affairs, we shall be no longer in the dark, but on the contrary be able to pronounce, and on good Evidence, That a proper Regard to Things abroad is the surest Method of making Affairs go right at home.

To ascend no higher in our History than the Reign of *Henry VIII.* his Maxim was, that, as King of *England*, it was both his Interest and his Right to hold the Balance of Power in *Europe*; and he was so willing this Maxim should be known, that, at a Congress abroad, he caused an Archer to be embroider'd on his Tent, with this Motto, *The Side I take shall prevail.* He had frequent Opportunities of making good this Declaration, by changing Sides, as the Possession of Power varied, and he did it so dextrously through the greatest Part of his Reign, that he was equally revered by Foreigners, and admired by his own Subjects. I do not pretend to apologize for or even to enter into the Measures he pursued at home; for whether they were right or wrong, it will equally serve my Purpose, since all our Historians agree it was the Figure he made abroad enabled him to carry Things so successfully in his own Kingdom, and notwithstanding so turbulent

a Reign to die in full Possession of the Affections of his People.

Under his Son and Successor *Edward VI.* the Duke of *Somerſet*, Protector of his Person, and of his Dominions, lost himself by his pusillanimous Behaviour. He was afraid of disobliging foreign Powers during a Minority, and especially after he found himself distressed by Factions at home; and this Disposition, instead of strengthening him against, laid him open to the Intrigues of his domestick Enemies, who, by insisting on his Want of Conduct in this respect, destroyed the Reputation he had deservedly acquired by his Care of Religion and his Tenderness for the People. His Successor in the Administration, the great Duke of *Northumberland*, lost himself the same Way; he was too attentive to the Concerns of his own Family, and had too little Regard to the Credit of the Nation abroad, which encouraged the *French* to incroach on our Possessions upon the Continent, and to plunder our Merchants, which made this great Duke universally odious to his Countrymen, and pav'd the way to his Destruction in the next Reign.

The Government of Queen *Mary*, harsh and rigorous as it was, grew more and more established, while she acted a consistent Part with respect to foreign Affairs; but when, in consequence of her Marriage with *Philip*

II. she engaged in a rash War with *France*, and sacrificed the Interest of her own Kingdom, as well as the Care she ought to have had of the Balance of Power in *Europe* to her private Inclinations, all things went wrong. Her Subjects grew uneasy; her Parliaments censured her Measures; her Ministers lost their Authority, and the falling of *Calais* into the Hands of the *French*, broke her Heart, and ruined all her Designs.

Queen *Elizabeth*, from her very Accession to the Throne, discovered a right Judgment in this respect; she found the Kingdom in a lower and more distressed Condition than it had ever been, and yet she had the Courage to begin her Administration with the Care of her foreign Concerns; and by a prudent Pursuit of her Father's Maxims, held the Balance of Power as long as she sat on the Throne. It may not be amiss however to observe, that as right as this Conduct was in itself, and as much as it has been applauded by Posterity, yet the Expediency of it was much doubted at the Time, and many Reflections were made on *Cecil*, who was thought to be the Author of this Measure; so that the Rectitude of any step taken in Politicks will not secure it from Opposition; nor is it a certain Sign that a Measure is either ill intended, or wrong in itself, because it is opposed. If either of these were to be taken for Rules, the best Men in every Nation

Nation would very frequently be left at the Mercy of the worst.

It was the Misfortune of King *James I.* that he neither understood foreign Affairs himself, nor had any Minister who was either capable or honest enough to give him proper Advice about them. To this was owing his strange Conduct in regard to the King of *Bohemia*, and his tedious Negotiation with *Spain*, the Folly of which was publick to the whole Nation, while it was seriously pursued by him and his Ministers. The Contempt that this drew upon his Councils, and the mean Figure he ever afterwards made, are sufficient Proofs of the Mischiefs that must attend a timorous Administration, and a Humour of negotiating against the Voice of the Nation.

In the next Reign things went little better; the King engaged in a *Spanish* War indeed, but whether to gratify the People or his Minister, is a Secret Time itself has not been able to discover. As this War was strangely begun, it was as unluckily prosecuted. The *French* War followed, and the unfortunate Business of *Rochelle* brought the Favourite to an untimely End, and intirely ruined the Affairs of his Master, who, after losing all Weight abroad, soon became unable to keep himself on the Throne at home.

Such as have written our History impartially, and without suffering the miselves to be misled

misled by Prejudices of any sort, readily confess, that the Rump-Parliament managed Foreign Affairs with equal Magnanimity and Success. They truly deserv'd that Praise, which is commonly bestow'd upon *Cromwell*, who executed indeed with Vigour, whatever he projected, but who either understood the Interest of the Nation very little, or regarded it not at all. For he sacrificed our Trade by an unjust and impolitick War with *Spain*, and he laid the Foundation of the Power of the *French*, which has given *Europe* so much Disturbance ever since.

King *Charles II.* at his Return had certainly right enough Notions of things; and as we never had either a Prince of greater Capacity, or more Experience, we have the better title to censure the bad Measures he took. His first War with *Holland* was made against the Advice of the Earl of *Clarendon*, who, tho' he might not understand the Art of intriguing with foreign Courts, yet was an honest Man and an able Minister, one who was perfectly acquainted with the Interest of *Great-Britain*, and gave the King right Advice, if he would have followed it. After the Banishment of that Nobleman, the *French* King found it no difficult matter to ruin King *Charles*, first by seducing him into Measures directly opposite to his true Interest, and then by inflaming the Party that opposed these Measures, to Acts that were not, perhaps,

haps, very consistent with our Constitution.

By the same Arts that kept the last-mentioned Prince always uneasy, his Brother was brought to quit his Throne, and to become an Exile at that Court, the Intrigues of which had brought all his Misfortunes upon him. Henceforward, the System of foreign Affairs became plain and settled, and our Princes could not avoid seeing and knowing what their Interest was, in this respect. The Scheme of *France* was plainly the obtaining the supreme Power in *Europe*, making all other Potentates subservient to her Purposes, and never permitting them to pursue such Measures, as were most proper for securing, or enriching themselves. It consequently became the business of every State, desirous of maintaining its natural Independency, and that happy Distribution of Power, which renders *Europe* the most potent, and at the same time the most civilized Quarter of the Globe; it became, I say, the business of every such State to oppose the Progress of *French* Influence: and since none of them were strong enough to do this with Success alone, a Confederacy was the only natural, indeed the only possible way, by which they could do it, and to their entering into such a Confederacy, *Europe* owes all the Freedom she has enjoy'd from the Year 1688.

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It must be allowed by all, who are acquainted with the Character and Conduct of King *William*, that he thoroughly understood, and steadily pursued his true Interest, as far as the Circumstances of things, and the Violence of Parties would give him leave. He found the Crown, when he attain'd the possession of it, in a great measure stripp'd of its patrimonial Estate, and in a manner wholly dependant for its Support upon the People. The Nature of the War in which he was engaged, render'd it far more expensive, than any which the Nation had enter'd into since the Days of *Henry VIII*. For the Reader will observe from the foregoing succinct Account, that most of the Disputes, in which we were from that time engaged, were managed by a naval Force, whereas we were now necessarily obliged to employ a Land-one. In order to obtain the requisite Supplies, in spite of the Opposition of a powerful Party, his Ministers found themselves constrain'd to run the Nation in debt, which had many bad Consequences then, and has since been productive of worse. We need not wonder, that while so many and great Difficulties were to be struggled with, and while *France* was in the Zenith of her Power, governed by a wise tho' ambitious Prince, assisted by a great Ministry, and her Armies commanded by the best and most experienced Generals of that Age;

Age; I say, we need not wonder, that in such a Conjunction, the War, tho' just, honourable and necessary, was not carried on with great Success. Indeed, if we ought to be surprized at any thing, it should be at the Firmness, with which this Prince maintain'd so unequal a Struggle, and that after so many Disappointments and Discouragements, as he met with, both at Home and Abroad, he was at last able to conclude a Peace so advantageous to his own and the common Cause, as that of *Ryswick*; which was entirely owing to his great Abilities in the Cabinet, and to the Foresight of the *French* King, that sooner or later his Steadiness would overcome all Difficulties, and accomplish the great End he propos'd, of securing the Balance of Power in *Europe*.

The Partition-Treaties, which have been so loudly and universally condemn'd, were not the Effects of any Weakness in the King's Councils, but of the Weakness of his Government, or, to express it more clearly, of his Interest among his Subjects. He was sensible of his want of Power to carry on another War, and this induced him to enter into Negotiations, from which he hoped the same Effects a successful War might have produced, *viz.* the weakening of the *French* Power, by creating a Repugnancy between its Interests and those of some Princes, who were then beginning to depend upon it.

But this Resource fail'd him; the same Party that hinder'd him from carrying his point by the Sword, distress'd him on the score of those very Measures which their Obstinacy had made necessary, and impudently ascribed to the King's want of Will, or Wisdom, what they knew was owing only to his Weakness, which was produced by their Cunning. They were then in a manifest Conjunction with *France*, tho' the Opposition they gave to the King's Measures, was founded on a pretended Aversion to the King's Intercourse with that Court, upon which they had forced him. He disengaged himself, however, very dextrously from this disagreeable Measure, and with much ado form'd a second Confederacy, which fix'd things once again upon their old bottom.

We may be convinced, if we will not shut our Eyes against all Conviction, from the Progress of the War in the Reign of *Queen Anne*, that nothing but our own Mistakes, flowing from the particular and pernicious Views of Factions, can possibly hinder us from holding the Balance of Power, and thereby securing ourselves, and the rest of the Powers of *Europe*, from becoming dependant upon *France*. In the beginning of her Reign, all Parties united heartily in the true Interest of their Country, and in consequence of this, *Great-Britain* was set at the head of the Confederacy, which, in the space of ten Years, brought

brought the *French* Power, which had been growing for half a Century, within a Hair's-breadth of Ruin ; and if at last our intestine Divisions had not broke out again, we might have compelled her to such a Peace, as would have made us and our Allies full amends for that mighty Expence of Blood and Treasure, we were at in the prosecution of this glorious War. But so it happen'd, that after all our Successes, we made a separate Peace, by which we got little or nothing ; and which was worse, we lost our Reputation with our Neighbours, and consequently all Pretence to holding the Balance ; which is not only a Point of Honour, that *Great-Britain* has a right to claim, but a Point likewise of such Consequence to her Interest, as she cannot give up without the greatest Danger to herself, as well as the greatest Inconveniency to the common Cause, as Experience has now shewn the Multitude, and as Reason had long before taught the Wise.

I make no doubt, that many critical Readers will be offended with the Length of this Introduction ; which is, however, as short as I could possibly make it, consistent with my Design. For, previous to the Account of present Measures, it was necessary to lay down some Rules for judging of the Rectitude of our Conduct in respect to Foreign Affairs ; and I knew the Temper of the Age too well, to pretend to lay down

any Rules, without shewing at the same time the Reasons on which they are founded. From what has been said, I think I may, without any Apprehension of being refuted, deduce the following Maxims: I. That it is the Duty of every Administration to make the Nation's Figure Abroad a principal Object of their Attention. II. That our Figure Abroad must depend upon our holding the Balance of Power, and being at the head of that Interest, which opposes universal Monarchy. III. That in order to this, we must lay aside all particular and Party-Prejudices, and consider the Interests of our Neighbours, so far as they regard the Common Cause, as much as we do our own; and for this plain Reason, that unless we pursue such a Conduct, we cannot possibly consult our own.

These Maxims being laid down, I shall, without farther ceremony, proceed to examine by them our Conduct for some time past; and in order to this, I must take notice, that we did not revive our Charge of affecting universal Monarchy on *France*, before it was evidently the thing she aim'd at. To take up the historical Thread I just now laid down, and run thro' all the Transactions, that have happen'd from the Peace of *Utrecht* to the present time, to shew how reasonable our Conjunction with the Regent was, and the precise Minute, when it became apparent, that the *French* had deserted his,

his, and resumed their old Scheme of Policy, would draw this Discourse into too great a length, and at the same time fatigue the Reader with the Repetition of many things, with which he is as well, or better acquainted than I am. I shall therefore content myself with a succinct Account of Cardinal *Fleury's* Plan, so far as Experience and Reason will allow us to trace it; and this, in order to render it evident, that our Interposition was absolutely necessary, and perfectly right, provided the Advice given to King *Charles* the Second by so many Parliaments, the Plan laid down by King *William*, prosecuted so successfully in the succeeding Reign, and to which all the Parties in the Nation have declared themselves thoroughly reconciled since, be a proper Rule of Conduct, especially when enforced by the repeated Resolutions of the last and present Parliament, and, till very lately, by the Voice of the whole Nation.

The last War between *France*, *Spain* and *Sardinia*, and the late Emperor, or rather the Peace made at its conclusion, first gave the World just grounds to suspect the Sincerity of Cardinal *Fleury's* Declarations. The Acquisition of *Lorrain*, without the giving of any Equivalent by *France*, for to the Grand Dutchy of *Tuscany* she never had any pretensions, was enough to alarm all her Neighbours, and to put them upon their guard; tho' I confess, as things then stood,
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it might not have been prudent to have declared immediately against her. The unaccountable Ascendency, which his Eminency gain'd over the Court of *Vienna*, by his pretending to become a cordial Friend to the Pragmatick Sanction, could not but oblige such Powers, as had a real concern for the Interest of the House of *Austria*, to act with Caution ; since any vigorous Measures of theirs might have afforded *France* a colour for doing that, which since, confiding in her own Strength, she has had the boldness to act with a bare face. The Peace made with the *Turks*, and some Transactions which follow'd it, would very probably have open'd his Imperial Majesty's Eyes, if he had not been snatch'd from the World by a sudden Death. This was the Signal to the Cardinal's Emissaries in all the Courts of *Europe*, to begin their Attacks on all the several Balances, by which the Tranquillity of the Powers of *Europe* is maintain'd in its several Quarters ; and it must be confessed, that they exerted themselves so vigorously, and were so amply supplied with Money, and Promises, which were then esteem'd equal to Money, that in an instant the face of things was changed, and the Affairs of most of the Northern, *German*, and *Italian* Courts, were managed by Directions from the Cabinet at *Versailles*.

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The maintaining a proper Balance in the North hath been always esteem'd a Point of the utmost Importance to the general Peace and Safety of *Europe*, and no Power ever found an Interest in destroying this Balance but *France*. It was Cardinal *Richlieu* brought the *Swedes* into *Germany*, in order to break the Power of the House of *Austria*; and when he found that the great *Gustaphus Adolphus* became too powerful to remain a Creature of his, it has been justly suspected that he found means to take him off. Since that time the *French* have more than once serv'd their Purposes by their Intrigues in this Kingdom, tho' the most judicious Politicians among the *Swedes* long ago discern'd that their own Affairs were much hurt by them; which induced the very learned *Puffendorf* to write a Treatise upon this Subject, wherein he has fully demonstrated, how dangerous it was to the true Interest of *Sweden* to become the Instruments of that ambitious Court. Every body knows what Pains was taken by *France* to secure the late *Charles XII.* when he was in the Zenith of his Power, and how little Regard she shewed for him or his Concerns, when he fell into Distress. From the time of his Decease, and the Accession of the late Queen and her Consort, the *Swedes* became a new kind of People; they recovered their Liberty, reviv'd their Trade, restored their Affairs in all Respects,

spects, and by the Care of an honest Administration at home, and a steady Adherence to their natural Allies abroad, heal'd in a very short time the dangerous Wounds their State had received during the long and unequal War, into which the Obstinacy of their late King plunged them.

With this Nation the Cardinal began, and that he might mold them into a fit Temper to serve his Purposes, ruined their Affairs, and threw them into the utmost Confusion. The Business of *Poland* gave him an Opportunity of making the first Impressions upon them. King *Stanislaus* had been the old Ally of *Charles XII.* Many of the *Swedish* Officers had serv'd under him, and some of the Nobility had a great Respect for him. This disposed them to be well enough pleased with the Scheme which *France* seem'd to have form'd in his favour; and under Colour of promoting it, they were drawn into some Practices of which the World knows very little, and had still known less, but for the unfortunate End of Baron *Sinclair.* This opening made Way for the Change of the old Ministry, and the reviving of that Spirit which shew'd itself in the two last Diets, and produced the War with *Russia*, as extraordinary in its Management as it has been unfortunuate in its Event. Every body knows that *French* Money and *French* Influence have had these Effects, but every body is not acquainted

acquainted with the Reasons that made them so necessary to the *French* System. To enter into a distinct Detail of them would take up too much room, and therefore I shall mention only a few. Before this War broke out, all the Northern Powers were rather averse, than well inclined to the *French* Design of ruining the House of *Austria*; and this made it absolutely necessary to kindle a War in this Quarter of the World, before any open Attempt was made to put that Scheme in execution. But besides their general Notions of the Expediency of maintaining the *Austrian* Power, the *Swedes* were under a particular obligation, as having guaranteed the Pragmatick Sanction. Lastly, their Engagements with the Maritime Powers would naturally have drawn them to have acted a part very opposite to that which they have since taken; and therefore we need not wonder, either at the vast Expence the *French* were at to force them into this War, or the little Care they have taken to bring them out of it with credit.

It was the business of the Cardinal to embroil them with *Russia*, let the Dispute end how it would; for by this means they were diverted from pursuing their true Interests, and the *Muscovites* were obliged to turn their Thoughts to this War, instead of affording a prompt and powerful Assistance to the House of *Austria*, to which they were e-

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nough inclined. The being revenged of *Russia* was another Stroke of the Cardinal's Craft. The Affair of *Poland* had shewn sufficiently the Temper of that Court, and that the Consequence of having a *Polish* Prince of *French* Principles was thoroughly understood there. As to any Concern in the Intrigues which produced the late Revolution in that Empire, I am disposed to acquit the Cardinal, because it was apparently more his Interest to have had *Russia* disturbed by intestine Divisions, than so well settled, as it now seems to be. But that the *French* might countenance the Malecontents, with a view to keep up those Divisions, tho' with no design to facilitate such a Settlement, is highly probable ; and for this, even the present Court can owe them no great Thanks. Thus far the Plan was well laid, and properly executed ; for the North was all in a flame, before any Sparks of War appeared in *Germany* ; and that I have given a fair Account of *Gallick* Policy in this part of the World, will appear to any Man, who considers the Pains that has been taken to draw off the Court of *Denmark* also, and to engage it to recall the Troops, which had enter'd into the Service of the King our Sovereign, and had been employ'd to secure his Electorate.

The Balance of Power in *Italy* was likewise to be overturned ; and in order to this, *Spain* revived her Pretensions to the Dutchy
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of *Milan*, tho' so often given up, and tho' that Claim was absolutely irreconcilable to the Treaties by which *Philip V.* had obtain'd the peaceable Possession of *Spain* and the *Indies*. *Parma* and *Placentia* were likewise to have been taken away, notwithstanding the more than Equivalent, which *Don Carlos* holds in lieu of them. The Duke of *Modena* was to have had his Pretensions satisfied, or at least he was told so; and his *Sardinian* Majesty, if he could have been prevail'd on to enter into this Scheme, might have had what Share he pleas'd of the Spoil; but that wise and generous Prince acted upon Maxims of another kind, and chose rather to be content with Territories which descended from his Ancestors, than by entering into so foul a Treaty of Partition, to aggrandize himself at the expence of a House, to which his Family ow'd so many Obligations. If this System had taken place, the House of *Austria* had been reduced to the single Dutchy of *Tuscany*, and must have held that too by a precarious Tenure; I mean, till *France* had so thoroughly establish'd her Plan, as to have no longer any Fears about *Lorrain*. Such were the Dispositions made for subverting the Independency both of the North and South, and for leaving no Power in either, capable of giving the least Disturbance to the House of *Bourbon*. Let us now proceed to the grand Design of cantoning

Germany in such a manner, as that, instead of being the Bulwark of *European Liberty*, it might be intirely subjected to the overgrown Power of *France*.

In the first place, it was contrived, that different Agents, at the several Courts of the most considerable *German* Princes, should, upon the Demise of the Emperor, insinuate, that this was the proper Time to push their respective Pretensions on the Dominions of the House of *Austria*; and as they were drawn to listen to this destructive Doctrine, they were encouraged to disclose their Designs to each other, and afterwards to make their joint Application to *France*. It is not to be wonder'd, that so many Princes, having severally fixed their Views on their own particular Interests, should for a Moment neglect those of *Germany*; or that, observing the Readiness of *France* to gratify them all in their respective Desires, and her seeming Disinterestedness on this Occasion, they should consider her rather as their common Friend, than as the ancient and irreconcilable Enemy of the Empire. The Secrecy too, with which the Nature of these Negotiations render'd it necessary they should be carried on, secured them from those Objections, which the ablest and wisest Counsellors in every Court would have raised against them, had they been made publick. But the close Intrigues of the *French* Ministers, their great Dexterity in exaggerating

rating private Advantages, and eclipsing those Inconveniencies which they must draw after them; the immense Sums of Money they had it in their power to squander, and the Probability of executing their whole Scheme, before the rest of *Europe* recover'd from its Amazement at seeing it break out, carried all before them for a time; and without doubt, *Fleury* at *Versailles* was esteem'd another *Richlieu*, or, perhaps, a greater Minister than he, tho' it is certain he only wrought upon his Plan.

We have seen, what the *German* Princes might propose to themselves by giving into this Scheme; but we have not hitherto adverted to the Advantages which *France* would have derived from it. In the first place, let it be remember'd, that its formidable Rival the House of *Austria* would not have been humbled only, but subverted; her Dominions would not only have been taken away, but shared amongst the Friends of the House of *Bourbon*: and this alone had been more than a sufficient Compensation for that prodigious waste of Treasure into which the *French* Minister run, to establish this System he had been so long contriving. But then let us, in the next place, reflect on the Situation, that *Germany* would have been in, after this Scheme had taken place. The *Bavarian*, *Prussian*, *Saxon*, and *Palatine* Houses would have been strengthen'd with the Spoils
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of that of *Austria*, and brought to such an Equality in point of Strength, as, by the Help of *French* Intrigues, would have hindered any Union in support of *Germanick* Liberty. For though it be true, that the Elector *Palatine* is far from having either Dominions or Revenues proportionable to those of the other three Princes, yet his close Conjunction with *France*, and the Vicinity of his Territories to those of that Kingdom, would have made him as useful, and at the same time a surer Ally than any of them. Thus the good old *German* Forms of Government, built on just and generous Maxims, tending equally to the Honour of the Head, and to the Safety of the Members of the Empire, would have been in effect destroyed, and a new Form every way much worse introduced ; so that thenceforward the Head of the Empire would have been distinguished only by sounding Titles, and a useless Precedency, the Direction of all things remaining in the Cabinet of *Versailles*, whence Orders, couched in Memorials, would have issued through the Canal of its Ministers, in the Courts of these Princes.

But if this Change would have been so unhappy for *Germany*, it would not have been less unlucky for the Maritime Powers. As for the United Provinces, they would not only have been deprived of their natural Allies and Protectors, which have more than once saved

saved them from becoming a Province to *France*, but they would have been on all sides surrounded by their Enemies, so that their Trade must have been speedily affected; and indeed the very Being of their State would have been rendered precarious. If our Situation as an Island had put us into a better Condition, yet could it never have lasted long without Friends, without Allies on the Continent; we should have been unable to have protected our Trade and our Plantations, and much more incapable of making head against *France*. I have indeed heard it suggested, and that by some, of whose Judgments I have a high Opinion, that we might have secured a new Balance of Power, by joining whatever Prince became possessed of the greater Part of the *Austrian* Dominions; but in order to this, we must have violated our Treaties in as high a Degree as *France* has done: and though this might be an easy step in an arbitrary Country, where Right and Wrong depend not upon the Nature of Things, but upon the Wills of Men; yet here I dare say it would have been impossible to have got this System relished. The whole Nation resented the ill Usage the Queen of *Hungary* had met with, and the Unanimity of all Parties in her favour sufficiently shews that such a Project would not have been feasible, and that we are not so totally corrupted, as some sanguine People imagine. Supposing however,

however, the thing had been practicable; supposing that such a step as this would have created a new Balance, must it not have been attended with great Danger and Expence? Would this new-raised Prince have quitted his Founder and Protector to court us? That certainly he would never have done, because thereby he would have immediately run a great Risk, and that upon uncertain Grounds. Well then, must we have courted him? If we had, I doubt it would have been to no purpose. To such a Power an Arbitrary Prince must have been a more natural and more stanch Ally than any free People whatever. It is therefore clear to me, that the Notion of creating a new Balance is a mere political Paradox, which Men of great Parts might plausibly defend, but which they could notwithstanding never be brought to approve in their Hearts.

We have now seen two things clearly made out; the one, that *Great-Britain* cannot safely sit still and see the Affairs of the Continent go this way or that with Indifference; and, secondly, that if ever she was bound in Interest to bestir herself in favour of her Neighbours, and against the ambitious Designs of an overgrown and overbearing Power, it was in the present Case, when an old Man, who had gained a high Esteem from his Character for Probity and Moderation, suddenly threw off the Mask, and, by
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his Intrigues, thought to subjugate all *Europe* to the Will of his Master, that is, to his own. I might have mentioned some other Consequences of this, which might have affected us more immediately ; but that I decline saying any thing, the Truth of which is not notorious, or mentioning such Apprehensions as some People might style imaginary, when the undeniable Mischiefs this System would have produced, are so many and so great. In a word, if the Safety or Tranquility of *Europe* ; if the Freedom of its respective States, and the several Balances of Power in the *North*, in *Italy*, and *Germany*, deserve at all our Attention ; or, to carry the matter still farther, if our own Independence, if the Security of our Commerce, of the Sovereignty of the Sea, upon which we pique ourselves so much, be at all worth our Care, then was this a Crisis that demanded all our Attention, and Respect to our Interests abroad ought to have superceded all such Concerns (as were incompatible with them) at home ?

That these were the Sentiments of our present Ministers even before they came into the Ministry, is what all the World knows, and that they were in those times taken for the Sentiments of the Nation in general, is what their bitterest Enemies cannot deny ; we need not therefore wonder that they have pursued them ever since with the utmost Dili-

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gence, nor ought we to censure them on that account, till it can be shewn that these Measures are wrong in themselves ; and if even that were possible, we might still plead in their Excuse, that not only they, but the whole Nation were mistaken. This, however, is certainly out of the Case, such as really wish well to the present Establishment, to the Peace, Welfare and Trade of their Country, must agree as to the Rectitude of these Proceedings in themselves, and can entertain no Doubts, unless it be as to the Wisdom and Vigour with which they have been carried on, and therefore let us apply ourselves to clear up these. It must be allowed, that when the present Ministry entred into Power, they found some steps taken towards the counteracting the *French* Scheme, and these they have pursued and perfected with such Alterations as were requisite to give them greater and more immediate Influence ; they found Armies on foot, and Fleets abroad ; they have made use of both, not for Shew and Parade, as some have maliciously, or at least unknowingly pretended, but for all the Purposes, that, as things were circumstanced at home and abroad, they could possibly be brought to serve, as will be shewn hereafter.

In order to do all this, they have indeed taken some steps, which, how justly I will not say, has exposed them to some Degree
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of Censure. Amongst these I think we may principally reckon three: First, the proposing and obtaining the Grant of very large Supplies from Parliament; but without these, what could they have done? What Ministry ever pretended to carry on a War without them? What could our Allies abroad have hoped, if they had not been obtained? Or, what would our Foes have had to fear? That the Parliament was very liberal, is confessed; that it was at all lavish, no Man can suspect, who considers why they gave, and to whom. Part of the Supplies were on account of a War, in which we were previously engaged, not only with the Consent, but by the Advice of Parliament, the rest for the Support of the common Cause, the Importance of which I have already demonstrated, and if it were necessary I could produce very authentick Proof, that the Eyes of all *Europe*, I mean of all the independent Part of *Europe*, for as to the Creatures and Dependants of *France*, as they are Asiaticks in their Nature, I think they ought not to be comprehended under that Name, turned their Eyes upon our Parliament, to see whether that august Assembly would once more furnish the Means for their Deliverance, or whether, through an ill-timed Frugality, they would give up their Neighbours first, and themselves in the End, to a Condition little better than Slavery. On this head therefore, I think the Ministry

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ought to stand acquitted, especially if we consider, that all these Sums, as they were obtained for certain Purposes, so they are appropriated, and must be accounted for; which clearly shews, that, as they were the Nation's Money before the Grant, so they are now to be applied for the Nation's Service, according to the Directions of their Representatives.

The second Objection made to their Conduct has been their endeavouring to quiet our Fears, and stifle our Animosities; whereas, in the Opinion of some People, they were bound in Duty to push our Disputes to the utmost, and to have satisfied the Party they headed by the Ruin of that which they have defeated. But to a candid Enquirer their Method of proceeding must appear equally prudent and just. For when a Nation is engaged in a dangerous and expensive War abroad, there cannot surely be a wiser or better Conduct pursued than that of keeping all things calm at home, and, on the other hand, in a free Nation the Extinction of Parties is no more a desirable thing than the Extinction of Passions would be in human Nature; when fierce and unbridled, they are apt to produce Mischiefs; and yet unless excited by them, we should seldom have Spirits enough to perform any thing eminently good. Their not going therefore such sanguine lengths, as some People expected, demonstrates

brates their Temper and Moderation, and gives us ground to hope their whole Administration will be of this Complection : and surely the *English* Nation will never think it a fit Motive for Complaint, that the Ministry are averse to Acts of Power, and are desirous of keeping their Authority within bounds.

A third Topick of Censure has been their not procuring the Repeal of some Laws, and the enacting of others, which have been thought necessary for the Nation's Service, and which, as good Servants to the Nation, they were bound to procure. But those who are fond of fixing this Censure upon them, have not perhaps reflected, whether at this Juncture it might not be proper even for the warmest Friends to those salutary Laws to suffer them to be postponed. The Heads of a Party will always push the Demands of their Party, whether they be seasonable or not ; but the Servants of the Publick must have Respect to fit Times and proper Opportunities. They must finish one great Task before they attempt another, and while they are engaged in a particular War, and are perhaps at the Eve of a general one, no considerate Man will be surprized that they are loth to promote any Alterations in the Constitution, which, whenever they are brought about, require long Deliberation, and the utmost Caution, that we may not
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be hastily brought to think of Alterations again. He who is for delaying a thing, is not to be judg'd from thence averse to that thing, especially if it be a matter of Weight and Difficulty ; on the contrary, it is most probable, that he avoids hurry, that he may perform it the more perfectly ; and this we are the rather bound to believe, if no formal Declarations have been made against it. On the whole then, all that from the strict Rules of Evidence, we can collect from this Behaviour of theirs, amounts to no more, than that they judge our Foreign Concerns, at this particular Juncture, of such high consequence, that they are unwilling to embarrass themselves farther than Necessity obliges them with the care of other things. Now, to be satisfied as to the Truth of this, and that we may be sure this is the real Motive which has led them to this manner of acting, we are to consider, whether, after all these Precautions, they have acted as if this had been the principal Object of their Attention, and whether, from the Pains they have taken about it, we have reason to expect they will be equally indefatigable and successful in settling our Domestick Concerns.

As to Affairs in the North, they are so visibly changed for the better, that it cannot but afford every *Englishman* a sensible Pleasure to contemplate this Change. We had indeed

indeed concluded a Treaty with the late Regency in *Russia*, and possessed Count *Osterman*, one of the greatest Ministers in *Europe*, of the Necessity there was of opposing the *French* Scheme, which tended as much to limit the Independency of the Northern Powers, as any of the other States in *Europe*; but on the Ruin of this Government, and the Misfortune of Count *Osterman*, this whole Structure was overturn'd, and we had the Work to begin afresh. I do not mean by this, that the *Russians* were indisposed to an Alliance with us, or to break through the Treaty lately concluded; but that the new Administration had not the same Notions as to the general System of *Europe*, with which their Predecessors were possessed. There was besides, a very artful *French* Minister then resident there, who had great personal Credit with the *Czarina*, and who could not but derive from thence some Weight with her Ministers: yet all these Obstacles have been overcome; the Iniquity of the *French* Designs has been again made manifest; the *Russians* have been shewn how treacherously that Court dealt with them, in respect both to War and Peace, and the effect of these Representations has been what we could have wish'd, for the *French* Credit is much declined; their Minister is treated with Civility, instead of Confidence, and a new Treaty has been concluded with us, the

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Nature of which must be very speedily known from its Effects.

As to the *Swedes*, they too have been taught to open their Eyes, and to look with Horror on the *French* Practices for their Destruction. To be convinced of this, we need but look on the Speech made by the Marshal to the present Diet, wherein he ascribes all the Mischiefs they have suffered to foreign Influence over their Administration. We have a Minister there who is in the highest Confidence with the most considerable of the Nobility, and all the true Patriots in that Kingdom, as an undeniable Proof of which, we have seen the *Swedish* Minister here demand the Interposition of our Sovereign, where that of the *French* King had failed; and we have the Satisfaction of knowing, that the King has not only promised to use his good Offices with the *Russian* Court, but that these have also been accepted; and though it may be true, that *French* Influence is not entirely expelled that Country, yet it is pretty apparent, that it is upon the declension, and that strongly, since the *French* now court the *Danes*, and by engaging them in great Armaments by Land and Sea, think to intimidate the *Swedes*, when they can no longer command them. But when once a Peace is settled between them and *Russia*, this will be found a very feeble Expedient; and Experience will convince the K. of *Denmark*, that
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precarious Subsidies, and an unavailing Treaty of Commerce, are but indifferent Compensations for the Loss of useful Allies, and incurring the Jealousy of all his Neighbours.

Before we quit this Subject, it is necessary to observe, that the *French* have great Advantages over us in their Negotiations with these Princes. Whatever we do, must be done fairly and openly, from the Nature of our Constitution, and all the World must understand, upon what Terms we purchase their Friendship. But it is not so with *France*; the Minister there is only accountable to his Master, and therefore a liberal Distribution of *French* Gold to private Persons may be so managed, as to produce greater Effects, than much larger Sums given openly and for the Benefit of a Nation. If therefore, in spite of these Difficulties, we are in a fair way of triumphing over *French* Arts, and of bringing the *Swedes* to adhere steadily to their own Interests, and thereby promote ours and the common Good of *Europe*, we must not be surpris'd, that this has required Time and Application; nor ought we to refuse their just Praises to those, who have happily conducted the Negotiations, that were necessary to so salutary a Purpose.

Our Interposition in *Italy* has been still more efficacious, as it was begun very early, and our Negotiations conducted with the

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greatest Secrecy, The utmost pains was taken to raise the Jealousy of the *Italian* States, and to shew the dangerous Consequences of increasing the Power of *Spain* in *Italy*. This had in some measure its effect, tho' the mountainous Promises of the *Spanish* Ministry overcame the Duke of *Modena*, and engaged him to act such a part, as has drawn upon him a just Punishment. When this was done, and the King of *Sardinia* appear'd inclined to enter into an Alliance for securing *Italy* from the Effects of foreign Invasions, by guaranteeing their Dominions to the present Possessors, this Disposition was happily improved; and tho' the Territories of her *Hungarian* Majesty and the Grand Duke were so drain'd of Troops, that it scarce seem'd possible to raise a Force sufficient to look that of *Spain* in the face; yet in consequence of this Alliance, and the Subsidies granted for support of it, the Scene was suddenly chang'd, and the combined Powers, from the very breaking out of the War, have been superior to the *Spaniards* and *Neapolitans*, notwithstanding the former transported into *Italy* a veteran Army, commanded by the Duke *De Montemar*, the same General who conquer'd *Naples* and *Sicily* for *Don Carlos*, and was deservedly look'd upon, as the best Officer they had.

The Assistance given his *Sardinian* Majesty, by our Fleet in the *Mediterranean*, has
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been equally ready and successful, inſomuch that the ſecond Scheme of *Spain*, of entering *Italy* thro' *Piedmont*, has been render'd as abortive as the firſt; and their ſhort-lived Gleam of Succeſs in *Savoy* has proved a new Miſfortune to them, thro' the excellent Conduct of our victorious Ally. Yet even this might have been render'd precarious, but for our well-timed Viſit to *Naples*; a Meaſure ſo vigorous, and ſo dexterouſly conducted, that Poſterity will read with ſurprize the Story of Commodore *Martin's* Negotiation, who found a way to compleat a Treaty of ſuch Conſequence at one Interview, and overturn'd the three Years Preparations of the *Neapolitan* Court in an Hour. If either of the Branches of the Houſe of *Bourbon* had gain'd ſuch ſignal Advantages as theſe, what triumphant Arches, what Medals, what Inſcriptions had blazon'd their Wiſdom and Valour to ſucceeding Times? The *British* Reputation ſtands in no need of ſuch Helps; a bare Relation of the Matter of Fact is ſufficient for our purpoſe, and the Terror, ſtruck by our Squadron into the City of *Naples*, recorded in their own Hiſtories, and by their own Writers, will abundantly eſtabliſh the Memory of this noble Exploit. In conſequence of this, the Hopes of *Spain* were a ſecond time blaſted, the *Neapolitan* Army return'd into the Dominions of *Naples*, and the *Spaniards* retired precipitately, not well

knowing where to go. The Motions they have since made, are rather Testimonies of a restless Resentment, than of any thing else, and if the peremptory Commands of the Court of *Madrid* should engage the King of the Two *Sicilies* to break his Neutrality, the Consequences cannot but prove fatal to himself. These are Things notorious to the whole World; and if we reflect on the vast Expence, with which the *Spaniards* transported their Forces into *Italy*; the immense Sums that it has cost to maintain them there, and the Necessity they are under of continuing, how little soever they are able, all these Expences: I say, if we reflect on this, and on the Ruin of so formidable a Force, we must discern, that nothing could have been projected so effectual for the Destruction of the *Spanish* Power, as this Contrivance of their own, which has at once exhausted their Treasures, and entirely ruined their Armies; neither of which they have it in their power, while this War continues, to recruit.

We have hitherto consider'd the Conduct of *Great-Britain* on this side, in the Light only of an Ally to their *Hungarian* and *Sardinian* Majesties; but it will be easy to shew, that she has not behaved with less Skill or Success, in respect to her own Affairs. By the Use that has been made of our Fleet in the *Mediterranean*, we have effectually secured our own Trade, and as effectually destroyed

stroyed that of our Enemies. I content myself with that general Expression, because a more particular Explication would be at this time improper. I may, however, be allowed to say, that we have cut off all Commerce between the *Spanish* Provinces, and have prevented their sending any Supplies by Sea to their Army in *Italy*. We burnt their Gallies, the most useful Ships they had, in the Bay of *St. Tropez*, we have insulted their Coasts, we have forced them to fortify almost all Places near the Sea ; and at this instant, when they can so little afford it, they are providing, at a great Expence, against an Invasion at *Majorca*. Add to this, that we keep their Fleet block'd up at *Toulon*, and by this means have deprived our Enemy of their Naval Force, as we have before shewn, that it is entirely owing to us they have lost their Land-one. What more could have been done against an Enemy, that is never seen but behind Entrenchments on Shore, and never appears at all at Sea, I must confess I am at a loss to know ; and if what has been already said, be not a full and satisfactory Answer to that trite Question, What is become of the War with *Spain* ? I must conclude it unanswerable ; because those who ask it are resolved not to be answered. We have on this Head done all that could be done, and tho' some of our wise Politicians may expect, yet
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they would have found it impossible to do more.

After making it evident, that the Tempest raised by *France* in the North, in order to prevent the Powers there from interfering with her Designs, has died into a Calm, which is in a fair way of being improved to the Ruin of all her Projects; and that her Arts, as well as the *Spanish* Arms, have been entirely baffled in *Italy*, and exposed to the Contempt of all the sage Politicians of that Country; let us next proceed to *Germany*, and see, what has been done to unravel her Schemes, and render her utmost Efforts impotent there, notwithstanding the prodigal Waste of Blood and Treasure in order to make them effectual. But, previous to this, it will be proper to observe, that *France* had a much greater advantage over us here, than in the North; she could negotiate feelingly with the *German* Princes, while we could do no more, than endeavour to make them sensible of their own Interests. Cardinal *Fleury* might apply Millions of *French* Gold, and be sure of the Applause both of his Master and his Subjects; but if an *English* Minister had ventured to lay out any such Sums, he must have hazarded, nay, he must have lost his Head; and if he had contrived to give them under some colourable Pretext, the Discovery of this No-Crime would have been fatal

fatal to him. Besides, the Situation of *France* on the Continent enabled her to execute her Treaties as soon as they were concluded; she marched her Armies at once into the very Heart of *Germany*, and many of its Princes and States made a Semblance of receiving them with Joy, who were in reality terrified at the Sight. After all, the bare marching of these Troops was not sufficient either to warrant our declaring against *France*, or even to awaken those who were more nearly concerned than ourselves, to make a suitable Provision against its Consequences, by beginning to form a Confederacy. In short, there was a Necessity for suffering *France* to attempt the Execution of her Plan before we could counteract it, and we were obliged to let the Enemy strike first, that we might be able to strike at all.

The first Step that was taken, in order to disappoint the deep-laid Designs of the *French* in *Germany*, was, to supply the Queen of *Hungary* with a Sum of Money, as an Earnest of our Intentions, and for the immediate Expences in which so unequal a War engaged her. This I do not hesitate to ascribe to the present Ministry, though it was given before they came into Power, for Reasons that are so well known they need not be mentioned in this Place. The next was to attempt the opening the Eyes of some of the *German* Princes, who, from selfish Views to their own Interests,

rests, were not only engaged in a most unnatural Alliance for destroying the Power of the House of *Austria*, but were likewise made the Tools of their own Destruction, by accepting such a Plan of Partition as must have thrown them into never-ending Controversies one with another: But as this necessary Work was found to go on very slowly, and as *France* seemed resolved to push her Scheme even with greater Vigour than she had shewn at first, it was thought requisite to take quicker Steps on our Side, and with that view Proposals were made to the *Dutch*. Abundance of harsh Things have been said about those Proposals, by some uneasy People, as if the Interest of these Kingdoms had been postponed in that Negotiation, and that all we proposed to their High Mightinesses was in favour and for the sake of the E—— of H——. Now, though I pretend to have no Lights from the Ministry, and do not set up for a first-rate Politician myself; yet I think I can shew this to be no more than an ill-natured Reflection, grounded on an accidental Circumstance every way harmless in itself.

The Prevalency of the *French* Power in *Germany*, as it certainly affected *Great Britain*, so it threatened likewise his Majesty's *German* Dominions, and this merely on account of his Conduct in relation to the Queen of *Hungary*. What Wonder therefore if, being ill treated in both Characters, his Majesty resented it in both?

both? or, why should his *British* Subjects be either surprized or displeased, that, till Things grow riper, and the Season more fit for *Great Britain* to declare herself, his Majesty was willing to concert the Measures then immediately necessary for the Service of the common Cause as Elector of *Hanover*. This is a fair, an easy, and a natural Account of this Measure; and though it be true, that the *Dutch* did not come so readily into it as might have been expected, yet this was not certainly owing to any Dislike they had to an Alliance with *Hanover*, as has been very unkindly, and, at the same time, very idly alledged; but because they thought the Mischief was not as yet come home to them, and that, as Things stood, they might sufficiently secure themselves by arming without fighting. This is also a natural Account of their Conduct, and I am thoroughly satisfied a true Account of it. All the Stories that have been propagated of their ill Treatment of our Ministers, are absolutely false and groundless, if we except their avoiding an actual Compliance with our Demands, by alledging very plausible Excuses; the Grounds of which Excuses are already, many of them, taken away, and the rest are daily wearing out.

While the Ministry were thus using their utmost Endeavours, to give a speedy Check to the *French* Greatness, there happened a great variety of Events in *Germany*, which,

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by degrees, contributed to give a new Face to Affairs there. The King of *Prussia* was brought to an Agreement with the Queen of *Hungary*, by our Mediation ; and the Agreement then concluded, and the definitive Treaty which has since succeeded, will be found to have changed the System of Things in *Germany* entirely. The Consequences of this Treaty indeed have followed but slowly, as, When do Things of that Nature follow otherwise? But they have followed, and are daily following: The Mist has already been removed from before the Eyes of two great Princes, and it will very quickly appear, that other Princes are disposed to follow their Examples. The *French*, in spite of all the Advantages which have been before enumerated, were a long time before they brought their Schemes to bear. Where then is the Wonder that we have not succeeded suddenly in ours ?

It has, I know, been said, that our Mediation had very little Weight with the King of *Prussia*. And it has been likewise said, that the Queen of *Hungary* gained very little by that Negotiation : For the same People say, that she then gave him all *Silesia* to be neuter, whereas she might before have had him on her Side for half that Price. But all this has been said only by visionary People in their gloomy Fits ; and it happens, very unluckily, that, while they are saying this, they contradict themselves. Both the Courts of *Vien-*

na and *Berlin* have acknowledged the Influence of the *British* Mediation, and that in the most sensible and expressive Manner. As to what is said of the Queen of *Hungary's* losing by this Agreement, it can have no Weight with any body that considers the Temper of that Princess, and the Firmness she has shewn on all Occasions. If she gave up all, or the greatest part of *Silesia* to the King of *Prussia*, does it follow that this is an absolute Loss? Or, because he stipulates, by this Treaty, no more than a Neutrality, is it therefore certain that he shall never have warmer Sentiments? If the Treaty of *Breslau* had only determined the War between those Powers, and had had no farther Consequences, I can scarce conceive why both Courts should pay such high Compliments to the Earl of *Hyndford*. But if this Treaty was to be the Basis of other Treaties, and if in consequence of this Reconciliation, Things were to run into a new Chanel, and the Politicks of *Germany* to undergo such a Change, as through the King of *Prussia's* Influence, to give a happy Turn to the Affairs of the Queen of *Hungary*, and to the Interests of all the Princes of *Germany* in general, it is very easy then to see this Treaty in another Light. In truth, if we do not see it in this Light, we must fall into the same Blunder with those penetrating People who made the before-mentioned Objections. It was not the Influence of *Great*

Britain, say they, but the Impression made by the Queen of *Hungary's* Arms at the Battle of *Czaflau*, that induced the King of *Prussia* to make Peace. And in the same Breath they tell you, that this Prince, who made Peace because he was beaten, made it upon better Terms than he asked before. Is not this very consistent and probable? But then *Great Britain* prevailed upon the Queen of *Hungary*, immediately after this glorious Victory at *Czaflau*, to grant the King of *Prussia* twice as much as she obstinately refused him before, and this too upon worse Terms. Yet *Great Britain*, they say, had no Interest with either of the Powers; but it was the Battle of *Czaflau* produced this extraordinary Peace, by which the Vanquished got, and the Victor gave away, so great a Country. Are not these refined Politicks beyond all Comprehension? Had we not better take up with the former Account, which reconciles this whole Transaction to common Sense, and to the Consequences which this Treaty has certainly had; I mean the Accession of the King of *Poland*, as Elector of *Saxony*; and the new Negotiations which are not yet ripe enough for us to give any certain account of, but which must speedily discover themselves, and that questionless on the Side of the Queen of *Hungary*, who seems to be perfectly satisfied with the Train things are now in.

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That hitherto an Alliance has not been formed sufficient to give Law to *France*, and to prescribe such Terms to that ambitious Power, as may secure Safety to the House of *Austria*, and Peace to the rest of *Europe*, is true ; but then this is not at all owing to any Fault or Negligence in the *British* Ministry, as even their Enemies admit. They have taken all the Pains that could be taken to induce the *Dutch* to enter into their Views, and to make the Cause of Publick Liberty their Care, before they were forced to it by a Concern for their own Safety. If in this they have not fully succeeded, it ought not to be ascribed either to want of Abilities, or of Application at least, so long as Divisions *here* and *there* afford a much shorter and clearer Explication of the Difficulties they have met with. But, on the other hand, if all this be true, it is no less true that the utmost Efforts of *France* have been baffled by the Schemes our Ministers have formed, and by the Succours this Nation has supplied. It is as true, that, in consequence of several Treaties that have been negotiating with as great Diligence, and as much Success as the Nature of such things would admit, that there is now the highest Probability we shall be able to form a new Confederacy, as powerful as the old one ; and which, if we can but agree amongst ourselves, till it has wrought its Effects, will effectually reduce
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the exorbitant Power of *France*, and settle the Balance of Power in *Europe*, in such a manner, as that it shall not be shaken again for some Ages. This all the World is sensible of abroad ; this we have echo'd to us from all the Quarters of *Europe*. Of this *France* herself expresses the utmost Apprehensions, and the only People who either dislike or deride it, are a discontented Party at home, whom no Men, no Measures, can please ; and whom, since nothing can satisfy, it seems to be a vain thing to study any longer giving them Satisfaction.

In order to clear up this Point to rational and well-meaning People, we need only consider what were the favourite Topicks of such as declared themselves dissatisfied before the Removal of the late Minister. Were they not his want of Concern for the Honour of the Nation abroad, his neglecting our natural Allies, and suffering the Power of the House of *Bourbon* to become daily more and more formidable ? On the other hand, did the Friends of that Minister admit the Facts mentioned in this Charge, and then undertake to justify him in what he had done ? No, they did not, whatever some, who call themselves his Friends, may do now. They knew, that admitting such a Charge would have lost him the whole Whig-Interest, which has unanimously and uniformly contended for the opposite Measures ; I mean,

mean, for our being constantly at the Head of the Protestant and Independant Interest in *Europe*, for supporting the House of *Austria*, and the Freedom of *Germany*, and for opposing at all Times, and in all Places, the Increase of *French* Power, and the Progress of *French* Influence. This being so, who could have expected to hear the present Ministry, in so small a Compass of time, treated with such high Disrespect, and even threatned with Impeachments for prosecuting what the Nation told them was its own Interest, and for carrying on more vigorously that Scheme which the best Friends of the late Minister said (and I believe truly) he had laid down, for granting farther Supplies to the Queen of *Hungary*, for continuing to support the King of *Sardinia*, and for putting ourselves in such a Posture on the Continent, as to be able to act when Action shall become most necessary? If Impeachments at *Westminster*, like the Gibbets and Fires at *West-Smithfield* in former Times, are to be the Doom of Statesmen of both Parties, what Road shall the publick Servants of this Nation take to be safe? Or if the People, like a Weather-Cock, are to be thus blown about by the Breath of Calumny and Clamour, how shall any Pilot pretend to steer the Ship of this Commonwealth?

Another Train of Objections has been indeed set up, as it is natural for Men to object
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every thing against the Conduct of those they are determined to oppose. These Objections suppose, that the Malecontents are the best Friends to the House of *Austria*; and that all they are concerned about is, whether she has really had the Money voted her, whether we have been in earnest in serving her, whether our Troops in *Flanders* have been of any Use to her, or no; and in short, whether, after taking six Millions of our Money for their Support, the present Ministry have not put the greatest part of it in their own pockets, and left the Queen of *Hungary* and the Balance of *Europe* in the Lurch. To shape Answers to these Queries, certainly requires no great Penetration: we need only attend to what these People say, and what the Ministry have done, and the Mist will be dissolved, and the Prospect become clear at once. The Supplies granted to the Queen of *Hungary* could be no Secret to her, when they were made known to all the World: And in as much as she has publickly acknowledged the kind and constant Assistance of *Great Britain*, as she declares her Dependance upon it in her Speech to the States of *Lower Austria*, to doubt her receiving these Supplies, argues a large Stock of Malice, as well as very little Faith. The sending of our Troops to *Flanders* is thus accounted for, together with its Consequences, by his Majesty in his Speech. "I have, *says he*, in pursuance of
 " the repeated Advice of my Parliament, taken
 " such

“ such a Part as appear’d to me most conducive
 “ to the Support of the House of *Austria*, and
 “ to the restoring and securing of the Balance
 “ of Power. In this View I ordered a con-
 “ siderable Body of Troops to be sent from
 “ hence into *Flanders*; and, at the Close of
 “ the last Session, I foresaw and pointed out
 “ to you, that it might be incumbent upon
 “ me to enter into further Measures for the
 “ same great and desirable Ends. The Aug-
 “ mentation of our Strength in the Low
 “ Countries, became a necessary Step; for
 “ which purpose I sent, in concert with my
 “ Allies, sixteen Thousand of my Electoral
 “ Troops thither, with the *Hessians* in the *Brit-
 “ tish* Pay, in order to form such a Force, in
 “ conjunction with the *Austrian* Troops, as
 “ might be of service to the common Cause
 “ in all Events; and I doubt not but I shall
 “ have your Assistance in the Support of these
 “ necessary Measures.” I have cited this as
 a plain Narration of Facts, which doubtless
 will be justified where they must be examined.
 If we have put ourselves to much Trouble, it
 is plain we have put *France* to no less; we
 need only look on her Edicts for recruiting the
 Militia, and consider with what View they
 are published, to be convinced that the Mea-
 sures taken to distress her have not been inef-
 fectual. And if we recall to our Remembrance
 the Ruin of their veteran Armies in *Germany*,
 to which they will scarce have it in their

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power

power to send Recruits, we must confess, that something has been done towards reducing *France*. On the other hand, if we transported Troops, we could transport them no where so properly as into *Flanders*, the preserving of that Country being immediately the Concern of *Great Britain*, as much, perhaps, as it is of the Queen of *Hungary*; and that it has not been lost, or even invaded, is a good account of the Employment of these Troops, unless, after what passed in *Germany*, our Patriots would have been for trusting the *Bona Fide* of *France* in the Low Countries. Why these Troops have been encreased, while in that part of the World, by an Accession of Forces in *British* Pay, is accounted for in the foregoing Paragraph, wherein his Majesty tells us, that it was concerted with his Allies: And though, as a free People, we may take the Liberty now and then of supposing, that our Ministry may mistake or neglect the Interest of our Allies; yet sure we must give them leave to understand their own, and in consequence of this ought to be satisfied, that if these Troops could have been employed more for their Service elsewhere, they would not have concerted with us this Measure of keeping them here.

We come now to the last and great Question, The Expediency of taking *Hanoverian* Troops into our Pay, which has occasioned so great Clamour, and has induced some
 People

People to suggest, that it is Foundation enough even for a Rebellion. But, previous to this, it will be necessary for me to say something in reference to the Electorate of *Hanover*, and the King's Subjects there, independent of the present Consideration.

As it is extremely just and reasonable for us to expect, that the Concerns of these Kingdoms should no way suffer on account of the King's Dominions in *Germany*, and as it was very fit this should be provided for in the Act of Settlement; so, on the other hand, it is as natural to conceive, that, in a Country like ours, which is always divided by Factions, and where it is notoriously known, that this very Settlement was opposed by a very great Party, nay, carried but by a single Voice: I say, It is natural to conceive, that, in such a Country, a Spirit of Rancour will reign, and a thousand Surmises be perpetually rising in the Minds of discontented People in relation to these foreign Territories, even supposing the Prince upon the Throne to act, in respect to them, with the greatest Rectitude and Caution. It was so in our ancient Government, when our Princes had Dominions in *France*: And, the same Notions reigned after the Union of the two Kingdoms which composed this Island. Nay, to such a Pitch has *English* Jealousy sometimes risen, that it is recorded of as great and wise a Minister as ever this Nation had, that he wished *Ireland*

under Water, provided the Inhabitants were safe. I mention none of these as Cases any way parallel, farther than in their manifesting the Extravagancy of our Spirit, and that we are extremely capable of flying out into the most unjustifiable Excesses, upon none, or at least upon very slight Grounds. We ought therefore, upon all such Occasions as these, to watch over this restless Disposition, and not suffer it to transport us too far before we enquire into the Reason of Things, and the true Motives of those Transactions, at which we find ourselves apt to take fire.

According to the same Rule, by which it becomes fit that the Elector of *Hanover* should not meet with any Partiality in one Sense from the King of *Great Britain*, the Subjects of the Electorate of *Hanover* ought not to suffer on the other, in any Relation wherein they may stand to *Great Britain*, on account of both Countries having the same Sovereign. The Act of Settlement provides wisely, that *Hanover* should not be the Cause of *Great Britain's* suffering; but it would have been equally cruel and unjust, if, by any Clause in that Act of Parliament, it had been provided, that the Elector of *Hanover* should be in a worse State than he was before; or that we should have less Regard for him as Elector of *Hanover*, than before he became King of *Great Britain*. This Nation hath since, as well as it had before, a certain Relation to,
and

and Connection with the Protestant States of *Germany*; and as *Hanover* is one of these, we must have some Intercourse with her, and, in the Nature of things, our true Interests in *Germany* must have been, and still are the same. This, instead of being, as it ought to have been, a great Advantage to *Hanover*, has been in reality a Loss to her; for whenever our Princes have acted, as, according to this Maxim, they ought to act, the Enemies of their Family have not failed to give out, that they have sacrificed the Interest of this Country to that; whereas, in truth, they have served both, and been partial to neither.

Of this, many Instances might be given; but I will be content to speak in this place only of one, and that shall be the Case now under Consideration. The Elector of *Hanover*, upon the Demise of the late Emperor, might no doubt have made as good Terms with respect to his private Interest as any of the rest of the Electors; and that he did not do so, could be owing to no other Motives than Regard to Treaties, Respect for the House of *Austria*, and Concern for the true Interest of *Germany*: for a Prince acting in this manner, and staking as it were his whole Dominions in such a Cause, would *Great-Britain* have had no Regard, when at the same time she was bound in Interest to make this Cause her own? Or if, in such a Case, she would

would and ought to have afforded him her Assistance, is she releas'd from all Obligation in that respect, because it happens that the Elector of *Hanover*, who acts thus, is also King of *Great-Britain*? Does this any way affect the Rectitude of his Measures in that Character? Or ought we to be angry with such a Conduct in our Sovereign, as we should have applauded in a foreign Prince? Yet this is certainly the thing, and, stript of all Disguises, the Matter of Fact is no other than as it has been stated by me. The Electorate of *Hanover* has been in danger by the Conformity of its Elector's Proceedings with those of the King of *Great-Britain*; and if it was secured by a Neutrality with *France*, it was not till that became a Measure of Necessity; and this was no way at the Expence of *Great-Britain*. On the other hand, as to the Vote of the Elector in favour of the Emperor, it might be given him on another Motive, than setting up the Creature of *France*; and there are many Reasons to conceive it was given him upon another Motive: To believe the contrary therefore, is to believe what never has been or can be proved, and to believe it on the Credit of such People as we know would assert it, if they knew it to be a Falshood.

But it may be, indeed it has been often and loudly objected, that *British* Ministers proposed an Alliance between the Elector of
Hanover

Hanover and the States General, which, with some, amounts to a full Proof, that the Interests of these Kingdoms have been sacrificed to those of that Electorate. That such a Step should ever be taken by any *British* Ministers, will appear very improbable to any reasonable Man, who reflects but for a Moment: But that the two noble Lords, dishonoured by this Calumny, should ever be guilty of so silly, as well as flagrant a Treason against their Country, is what no Mortal, who knows their Characters, but must disbelieve as soon as he hears it. In the whole Dominions of *Britain*, I dare say, it would be very difficult, as corrupt a People as we are said to be, to fix on two Men of any Figure who would engage in such a shameful Action; and, on the other hand, I think it would be very hard to name two Persons more unlikely than the two who have been named, even supposing us as corrupt as some of our Countrymen (who, to be sure, know themselves best) would represent us. But as I said before, this Measure may be easily accounted for. The Elector of *Hanover* was in immediate Danger from the Influence of foreign Power in the Empire; and therefore it was very natural for him to have desired such an Alliance for removing that Influence, and for securing the Independency of the *Germanick* Body, a Point of very high Importance to the Maritime Powers. If therefore the States had entered into this Alliance,

and

and had furnished a certain Quota of Troops, I cannot help thinking, that it would have been one of the properest Methods, if not the properest Method for securing this great Point, without our becoming a Principal in any War that it might have occasioned. At least thus much is plain, that it would have render'd those steps unnecessary, which have been since so vehemently complained of, by raising immediately such a Force as was requisite for attaining that Purpose, which we have been now forced to compass another way.

The very same People who have expressed themselves with such Warmth against this Scheme of using the Elector of *Hanover's* Name, for providing a Force sufficient to answer this salutary End of succouring the Queen of *Hungary*, and protecting the Freedom of *Germany*, are at other times, disposed to shew no less Resentment, on a Supposition, that the Elector of *Hanover* has not exerted himself effectually in defence of her *Hungarian* Majesty. This is sufficient to prove, that they are not in reality dissatisfied with any Measure from a Conviction of its being wrong in itself, but that resolving to find fault with, and oppose every Measure that is or can be taken, they are obliged to have recourse to different Principles, that they may be able to raise some colourable Objections against what is done, and at the same time

time to suggest plausible Reasons in favour of whatever is not done. So that while *France* carries all her Designs into Execution under the Name of an Auxiliary Power, we are driven from that, and indeed from any other Expedient of that Nature, by its being made criminal for our Ministers so much as to attempt them, and at the same time even different Parties concur in representing it as a notorious Error in Politicks, for us to have recourse to the only Method that is left of *Great-Britain's* acting directly and openly, in a Cause which so nearly concerns her both in point of Honour and Interest; and to serve such wayward Purposes, as these, a step which was held just and honourable in the Reign of a Daughter of the late King *James*, I mean the taking *Hanoverian* Troops into *British* Pay, which was constantly done during the last general War, is made a Crime of the deepest dye in the Administration of his present Majesty. To do this more effectually, the utmost Pains has been taken to possess the Nation, that this is a direct Infringement of the Act of Settlement, which is equally repugnant to Justice and to Truth; for though the Act of Settlement does indeed provide, that the King shall not expose his *British* Dominions to protect those he possesses in *Germany*, yet I defy the ablest of these Politicians to point out the Clause in that Act, which restrains his present Majesty

or any Prince of his House, from staking his Electorate in the common Cause of Publick Liberty, or even in the Cause of *Great-Britain*.

From this Disposition of finding Fault with every thing, and a settled Resolution of never allowing the Measures of any Ministry to be right, proceed many other groundless Reflections that have been lately scatter'd among the People, merely to disturb and distract their Minds at this critical Juncture. Amongst these I reckon that strange Insinuation, that we are fighting now only for the Sound of the House of *Austria*; whereas nothing can be plainer than that we aim at preventing the House of *Austria* from becoming a Sound, by preserving to the Heiress of that House the Dominions of her Ancestors, to which we are bound by Treaties and by Interest. But then at the same time we are endeavouring to support the Liberty and Independency of *Germany*, and to secure a proper Balance against *France*, by bringing back all the Princes of *Germany*, without Exception, to a just Sense of their own Interest, and of the Importance of preserving the Dominions of the House of *Austria* intire, that it may the more effectually contribute to that Balance. When therefore the thing is considered in this Light, we can neither look upon it as an ill-adjusted or impracticable Scheme, especially when we remember the great Advances that have been
made

made towards it, and compare the present State of things in the Empire with the State in which they were less than a Year ago.

This is that Reduction of *France*, which is sought by the present Administration, and which they will certainly bring about, if those who have hitherto dash'd all Designs for curbing that ambitious Power do not acquire Strength enough to frustrate this also. We need not fright ourselves with the Remembrance of what extraordinary Efforts *France* made in the last War, when we see to how little Purpose the great Efforts have been, which she has made in this. If our Ministry had in view the taking from the House of *Bourbon*, *Spain* and the *Indies*, or any thing equivalent thereto, these Objections might be proper enough; but, as it is, they are quite wide of the Point: the thing now in question between *France* and us, is simply this, Whether she shall carry her Scheme of enslaving *Germany* into execution, under colour of supporting the Emperor's Pretensions to the Succession of the House of *Austria*; or whether we, in maintenance of our Treaties, and in support of our manifest Interest, shall endeavour to preserve to the Heiress of the House of *Austria* her hereditary Counties, and assist the Princes of the Empire, who are now convinced of their Errors, to expel the Armies of *France*, as they have shaken off her Influence, and restore

store the Empire and its Head, if he will consider himself in that Capacity, and not as a Creature of *France*, to the figure they ought to make in *Europe*? This, as far as can be collected from all our publick Acts, is the great Scheme which we have embraced; and what there is in this unworthy of being avowed, or which, if united amongst ourselves, is beyond our Force to accomplish, after all the learned Writings of our angry Politicians, we are yet to learn.

We value ourselves much on our Freedom of Thought, and on the Freedom of our Press; both of which, I dare say, are in as little Danger under this, as ever they were under any Administration; and therefore I think, never any Ministry had a better Title to the Use of both. Yet these, I dare say, are all the Force they will ever need to defend them against the ablest and most inveterate of their Enemies. If we will but dispose ourselves to hear patiently what can be said in support of their Measures, even by such as are not favoured by any Lights from them, but write purely from the Dictates of Reason and Experience, and from the Knowledge they have of what passes in the World in common with the rest of Mankind; I dare say, we shall be in no danger of sinking either into Slavery or Despair. But if it shall be ever thought criminal to animate the People of *Great Britain* to imitate their Ancestors, to assert

assert their Right of holding the Balance of Power, and set themselves at the Head of such States as are for maintaining the Independency of *Europe*, we may soon run back to that low State in which we were, when this Spirit was treated as *Don Quixotism*, and have nothing else to do but to harass and destroy each other with Disputes about Forms of Government which are equally fruitless and endless, and serve only to subject the honest, the industrious and well-meaning, to the self-interested Views of cunning and ambitious Men. The Way to be easy at home, is, to have nothing to fear from abroad; and when the Peace of *Europe* is once solidly settled, it is most likely that we should have it in our Power to restore whatever Parts of our Constitution, Length of Time, or Party-Rage, may have hurt; to lessen the Load of publick Debt, and to free us from the Taxes which oppress us; and to the imposing both of which, nothing contributed more than the opposing the just Designs of those who governed us in former Times.

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